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ABSTRACT
Corporate farms, often known as concentrated animial feeding
operations ("CAFO'), provide inexpensive animal products but do
so by externalizing the cost of their operation in the form of
environmental harms and risks to human health. This article
explores one possible approach to mitigating CAFO-caused harms.
It argues that CAFO regulation under any one of three Clean Air
Act ("CAA ") programs will result in net benefits, not just for air
i.D., Harvard Law School, Class Of 2017. The author is grateful to Professor Peter
Barton Hutt for giving him the opportunity to write this article, to Professor Jody
Freeman for sharing her passion for environmental law, and to his loving wife, Amanda,
without whose inexhaustible support this article would not have been possible.
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quality, but also for other CAFO-caused harms and thus, that CAA
regulation of CAFOs is a no-lose strategy. The article then goes
further to conclude that, while regulation under any one of these
programs would cause industry to internalize some ofthe costs ofits
operations, regulation under § 111 of the CAA most fully
accomplishes this and will therefore result in the best overall
outcomes for human health and the environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to reduce the cost of meat and other animal products,
farming has become increasingly vertically integrated.' These corporate or
factory farms, also known for regulatory purposes as animal feeding
operations2 (AFO), do in fact provide nominally' less expensive animal
products,4 but they produce, both in quality and quantity, tremendous
negative externalities.' These feeding operations endanger the
1. See generally Darian M. Ibrahim, A Return to Descartes: Property, Profit, and the
Corporate Ownership ofAnimals, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 93 (2007); see also
PEW COMM'N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., PUTTING MEAT ON THE TABLE:
INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA 5-7 (2008); Jerry L. Anderson,
Protection for the Powerless: Political Economy History Lessons for the Animal Welfare
Movement, 4 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (2011).
2. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1) (2012).
3. See DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, CAFOs UNCOVERED: THE UNTOLD COSTS OF
CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 3-5 (2008); PEW COMM'N ON INDUS. FARM
ANIMAL PROD., supra note 1, at 47.
4. CARRIE HRIBAR, UNDERSTANDING CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES 2 (2010) (explaining that when
handled properly, CAFOs can provide a low-cost source of animal products, enhance the
local economy, increase employment, and broaden the local tax base).
5. See GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 1-5; see also HRIBAR, supra note 4, at 2-
11.
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environment,6 create serious health risks,' and are inhumane to the animals,8
in addition to other harms.9 Countless solutions to the CAFO problem have
been suggested,"o including many recommending regulation of CAFOs
6. See, e.g., HRIBAR, supra note 4, at 2-7 (explaining that CAFOs exacerbate climate
change, contaminate ground and surface water, and pollute ambient air quality); J.
Nicholas Hoover, Can't You Smell That Smell? Clean Air Act Fixes for Factory Farm
Air Pollution, 6 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL'Y 1, 8 (2013) (detailing the negative effects
of CAFO ambient air pollution on the animals, local neighbors, and nearby bodies of
water).
7. See, e.g., HRIBAR, supra note 4, at 8-10 (indicating that CAFOs create an
increased risk of foodborne pathogens in animal products and reduce the effectiveness
of antibiotics in humans); Hoover, supra note 6 (linking CAFOs to respiratory
symptoms, headaches, nausea, increased incidence of infant mortality, and depression);
R. Jason Richards & Erica L. Richards, Cheap Meat: How Factory Farming Is Harming
Our Health, the Environment, and the Economy, 4 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 31, 48 (2012) (indicating grain-fed animals, such as those in CAFO,
produce fatter animal products than grass-fed animals); Vanessa Zboreak, "Yes, in Your
Backyard! " Model Legislative Efforts to Prevent Communities from Excluding CAFOs,
5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 147, 157 (2015) (explaining that animal products from
pastured animals are healthier overall).
8. Ibrahim, supra note 1, at 102-03 (describing CAFOs' squalid living conditions
and the animal mutilation employed to further limit the space the animals need). The
thrust of this article is anthropocentric, defining the positives and negatives of regulation
in terms of human benefit. For that reason and due to limited space, this article will not
address the moral quandary of the inhumane treatment of CAFO animals. The problem
is serious and merits more time and space than can be devoted to it here. For a more
thorough discussion, see generally Anderson, supra note 1, at 3 (comparing the CAFOs
to child labor); Robyn Mallon, The Deplorable Standard of Living Faced by Farmed
Animals in America's Meat Industry and How to Improve Conditions by Eliminating the
Corporate Farm, 9 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 389, 415 (2005) (calling for an end to
CAFOs).
9. See, e.g., HRIBAR, supra note 4, at 7, 11 (describing CAFOs' negative effects on
neighboring property values and the noxious odors that accompany their air pollution);
Emily A. Kolbe, "Won't You Be My Neighbor?" Living with Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operations, 99 IOWA L. REV. 415, 428-29 (2013) (indicating that CAFOs are a
local nuisance).
10. See generally, e.g., Susan M. Brehm, From Red Barn to Facility: Changing
Environmental Liability to Fit the Changing Structure of Livestock Production, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 797, 799 (2005) (proposing that liability for environmental harms be
changed); Justin Gundlach, What's the Cost of a New Nuclear Power Plant? The
Answer's Gonna Cost You: A Risk-Based Approach to Estimating the Cost of New
Nuclear Plants, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 600, 670 (2011) (implying that an informative
sponsorship could also be a solution for the CAFO problem); Sarah R. Haag, FDA
Industry Guidance Targeting Antibiotics Used in Livestock Will Not Result in Judicious
Use or Reduction in Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 26 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. REv. 313,
343 (2015) (calling for Congress to pass PAMTA); Emily Broad Leib, The Forgotten
HalfofFood System Reform: Using Food and Agricultural Law to Foster Healthy Food
Production, 9 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 17, 20 (2013) (suggesting that the government fund
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under the Clean Air Act (CAA)." Yet, despite the quantity of the
suggestions and the seriousness of the problem, various obstacles have
combined to prevent significant congressional or executive action to
ameliorate CAFO-caused harms.12
Four different executive agencies are responsible for the security of the
American food supply: the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)."
While some may see this as a fractured, and thus, inept system,'4 it can and
should be seen as a system that provides opportunities to take a second (and
third and fourth) whack at the same problem. Regulation by any one of these
agencies will alter incentives and thus change industry practice, potentially
beyond the scope of the acting agency's authority. This overlapping system
is also a reflection of the reality that no problem is truly isolated; food law
industry alternatives and remove barriers to entry); Ariele Lessing, Killing Us Softly:
How Sub-Therapeutic Dosing of Livestock Causes Drug-Resistant Bacteria in Humans,
37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 463, 463 (2010) (suggesting that non-therapeutic use of
antibiotics in animals be outlawed); Mallon, supra note 8 (suggesting that CAFOs be
outlawed altogether); Kelsey Peterson, Farming in the Modern Era: Feeding the World
with an Environmental Conscience, 5 SEATTLE J. ENvTL. L. 139, 141 (2015) (arguing
that only subsidies and not expensive regulation can properly alter industry incentives);
Kevin Schneider, Concentrating on Healthy Feeding Operations: The National School
Lunch Program, "Cultured Meat, " and the Path to a Sustainable Food Future, 29 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 145, 145 (2013) (suggesting that the National School Lunch
Program provides the solution).
I1. See generally, e.g., Jason Foscolo & Michael Zimmerman, Alternative Growth:
Forsaking the False Economies of Industrial Agriculture, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
316, 337 (2014); Hoover, supra note 6, at 1; John Verheul, Methane as a Greenhouse
Gas: Why the EPA Should Regulate Emissions from Animal Feeding Operations and
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Under the Clean Air Act, 51 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 163, 163 (2011); Sarah C. Wilson, Hogwash! Why Industrial Animal Agriculture Is
Not Beyond the Scope of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 441-
442 (2007).
12. See generally Jessica Brockway, 2014 Federal Legislative Review, 21 ANIMAL L.
365, 373 (2015) (indicating that a law to improve CAFO practices has been proposed,
but has been unable to pass for fifteen years); Nicholas Obolensky, The Food Safety
Modernization Act of2011: Too Little, Too Broad, Too Bad, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 887, 907 (2012) (noting that the FDA would be unable to carry out the vision of
the Food Safety Modernization Act because it was underfunded); Richards & Richards,
supra note 7, at 34 ("[Industry] lobbyists block initiatives to make food safer.").
13. See Julie Follmer & Roseann B. Termini, Whatever Happened to Old Mac
Donald's Farm ... Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation, Factory Farming and the
Safety ofthe Nation's Food Supply, 5 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 45, 45-46 (2009); Haag, supra
note 10, at 321-25.
14. See Haag, supra note 10, at 321 (referring to the multiagency system as a
"balkanized state" of food safety).
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problems are connected to environmental problems and vice versa." This
article lays out why EPA regulation of the emissions of a subset of AFOs,
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFO), under the CAA, while
perhaps incapable of curing all ills, is a no-lose strategy that will produce
changes in industry practices that will in turn result in net benefits for the
environment and human health.
Part I discusses the arguments in favor of CAFOs, the harms they
create, and a sample of government efforts made to address those harms.
Part II lays out EPA's options under the CAA for regulating CAFO
emissions and concludes that regulation under § Ill of the statute most
effectively causes industry to internalize its production costs. Part III argues
that any of the proposed regulatory actions under the CAA will engender a
responsive change in CAFO practices that reduces environmental harms,
risks to human health, or other negative externalities, producing overall net
benefits. It further recommends that EPA regulate CAFOs under § 111 of
the CAA to maximize those benefits.
II. BACKGROUND
For regulatory purposes, EPA defines an AFO as any lot or facility
where animals "have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and fed or
maintained for a total of 45 days or more in any 12-month period," and
where "[c]rops, vegetation, forage growth, or post-harvest residues are not
sustained in the normal growing season."" Particularly large AFOs are
defined as CAFOs." There can be no questions that CAFOs provide utility
to the country via reduced costs and abundance.'" Yet, these benefits do not
reflect the true cost of CAFOs' and are more than outweighed by the broad
harms that CAFOs cause.2 0 Congress and the empowered agencies have
attempted to take, and in some cases have actually taken,21 action to address
these harms. Yet, there is little hope that such actions will be effective.22
15. See Richard Lazarus, Food Law Is the Next Great Area for Environmental
Litigation, ENVTL. L. INST., Jan./Feb. 2016, at 13 (explaining that food law issues are
inextricably linked with environmental protection).
16. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1) (2012).
17. See id. § l22.23(b)(2), (4), (6).
18. See PEW COMM'N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., supra note 1, at 57 ("[T]he
current system ... has achieved a remarkable record of increasing productivity and
lowering prices at the supermarket . . . ."); Id. at 5 ("[S]ince 1960, milk production has
doubled, meat production has tripled, and egg production has increased fourfold.").
19. GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 9.
20. See id. at 3-5; PEW COMM'N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., supra note 1, at 47.
21. See generally 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (2014) (illustrating Congress taking action to
remedy harms caused by CAFOs); Haag, supra note 10, at 314.
22. See generally Haag, supra note 10, at 342.
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A. Arguments for CAFOs
The principle arguments in favor of CAFOs are economic.23 CAFOs
reduce the cost of meat and other animal products through mass production:
increasing supply and streamlining the production process.24 CAFOs create
jobs, stimulate the local economy, and provide a large local tax base.25 It is
undoubtedly true that factory farms were vertically integrated to make a
profit, but that does not detract from the reality that these corporations were
responding to an increased demand for food,26 one that family farms of an
earlier era may not have been able to meet.27
B. Harms Created by CAFOs
Meeting the increased demand may not be a good in and of itself, as it
created a meat-obsessed generation2 8 and has contributed to the obesity
epidemic of our day.29 Yet, even if all of CAFO benefits are accepted
unqualifiedly, they are no more than a feather on an unbalanced cost-benefit
scale when considering the broader risks to human health, the environmental
harms, and the harm to the animals themselves.30
23. HRIBAR, supra note 4.
24. See Peterson supra note 10, at 140 ("Modem farming techniques produce the
massive amounts of food needed to feed the growing global community in an efficient
and cost effective manner."); see also Richards & Richards, supra note 7, at 32, 35.
25. HRIBAR, supra note 4 (explaining that when handled properly, CAFOs can
provide a low-cost source of animal products, enhance the local economy, increase
employment, and broaden the local tax base).
26. See Peterson, supra note 10, at 140 (explaining that the agricultural industry's
modem farming techniques are a result of the attempt to meet "ever-increasing
demand").
27. But see GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 2 ("CAFOs do not represent the only
way of ensuring the availability of food at reasonable prices.").
28. See Schneider, supra note 10, at 146 ("America has a long-standing cultural and
gustatory love affair with all things meat, milk, cheese, and eggs . . . [and o]ver the last
fifty years, consumption has been on a steady rise .... ); Roberto A. Ferdman, Look at
What Our Obsession with White Meat Has Done to Chickens, WASH. POST (Mar. 12,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/12/our-insatiable-
appetite-for-cheap-white-meat-is-making-chickens-unrecognizable/ (describing how
our obsession for white meat has caused us to alter the biological structure of chickens).
29. See Leib, supra note 10, at 18 ("Rising rates of obesity stem from what has been
called a "toxic" food culture, in which unhealthy food products are cheap and readily
available . . . .").
30. See GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 9 ("Although consumers pay a relatively
low price for meat, milk, and eggs produced in CAFOs, society in general pays a high
price for such products in the form of taxpayer subsidies and damage to the environment,
public health, and rural communities.").
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1. Risks to Human Health
CAFOs pose two general types of human health risks: (1) animal
products from CAFO animals are themselves less healthy' and (2) the
unsanitary conditions and the large quantities of sub-therapeutic antibiotics
given to the confined animals create a greater risk that subsequent animal
products will carry foodborne pathogens and reduce the effectiveness of
antibiotics in humans." Due to the confined space and the massive demands
it would put on the land, CAFOs cannot pasture their animals; they must feed
them with grain instead." Grain is not the natural diet for these animals, but
such a diet is preferred not only because it facilitates a confined feeding
operation but also because it is higher in fat than a grass diet, producing
larger animals.34 This, unsurprisingly, leads to fattier meat.35 But it is not
just that grain-fed animal products are unhealthier for us, they also replace
healthier options due to their reduced nutritive value: "[g]rass-fed beef, for
example, has been shown to have higher concentrations of omega3 fatty
acids, beta-carotene (a precursor to vitamin A), conjugated linoleic acid, and
tocopherols (vitamin E) than those found in grain-fed beef."36  These
important nutrients reduce the risk of a host of physical and mental
ailments. CAFOs further reduce the nutritive value of their animal
products by increasing the products' food-miles. 3  The long distance that
such animal products must travel necessitates that the CAFO industry add
preservatives to the products to survive their long storage and transport.3 9
Though perhaps unavoidable in all cases,40 such concerns can be avoided in
local production, where animal products are "usually sold unprocessed" and
have contact "with fewer hands and mechanization."41
31. Zboreak, supra note 7.
32. HRIBAR, supra note 4, at 8-10.
33. Melanie J. Wender, Goodbye Family Farms and Hello Agribusiness: The Story of
How Agricultural Policy Is Destroying the Family Farm and the Environment, 22 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 141, 153 (2011).
34. Richards & Richards, supra note 7.
3 5. Id.
36. Zboreak, supra note 7.
37. Id. ("These compounds in the human diet reduce the risk, respectively, of
depression and Alzheimer's; vision loss and bone degeneration; cancer, atherosclerosis,
and diabetes; and cell degeneration from free radicals.").
38. See Leib, supra note 10, at 18.
39. Obolensky, supra note 12, at 930.
40. See generally Peterson supra note 10, at 140.
41. Obolensky, supra note 12, at 930.
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In addition to adding preservatives, CAFOs often irradiate animal
productS4 2 and give the animals massive doses of antibiotics" to avoid
pathogens. The unsanitary conditions and the close proximity of the animals
to one another not only creates an environment where pathogens can flourish,
but also one in which they can quickly spread.44 Because pathogens cannot
be completely kept out of animal products that come from those unsanitary
conditions, they are irradiated to sanitize them.45 But the effectiveness of
irradiation is controversial.4 6 Some studies claim irradiation could save
"over 350 lives ... [and could avert] more than 6,000 serious foodborne
illnesses . . . [every year]." 7 Others claim that it exacerbates the problem,
leading to more radiation-resistant pathogens.48
There are similar concerns about animal use of antibiotics to solve the
pathogen problem.49 If antibiotics were solely used therapeutically, that is,
to treat an actual illness, the concern may not be so great, but CAFOs use
antibiotics prophylactically to prevent disease.5 0  These sub-therapeutic
doses of antibiotics create a risk of antibiotic-resistance pathogens not only
in the animals but in humans as well.5' The CDC has called antibiotic
resistance a "worldwide problem," with approximately 2,250,000 illnesses
and 37,000 deaths in 2013 (the latest year for which data is available) in the
United States alone.52 It has advised that antibiotics in food-producing
42. Nathan M. Trexler, "Market" Regulation: Confronting Industrial Agriculture's
Food Safety Failures, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 311, 329 (2011).
43. Terence J. Centner, Regulating the Use of Non-Therapeutic Antibiotics in Food
Animals, 21 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2008) ("Experts argue that between eighty
and ninety percent of agricultural antibiotic use may be unnecessary.").
44. GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 64; see also Trexler, supra note 42, at 319-
20.
45. Trexler, supra note 42.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 329 n.141 ("All irradiation will do is add partially decontaminated fecal
matter to the American diet, a practice that is likely to cause food poisoning cases to
skyrocket when bacteria develop the survival tactics to resist irradiation.").
49. See generally Amanda Belanger, A Holistic Solution for Antibiotic Resistance:
Phasing Out Factory Farms in Order to Protect Human Health, 11 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 145, 145-46 (2015); Centner, supra note 43, at 1; Haag, supra note 10,
at 313; Lessing, supra note 10.
50. See Centner, supra note 43, at 9-13. Prophylaxis is not the only use of antibiotics
in CAFOs; antibiotics are also used to kill bacteria in the livestock's gut to facilitate the
absorption of nutrients from the non-compatible grain diet to produce larger animals that
then produce greater quantities of animal products. Id.
51. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS
IN THE UNITED STATES 36-39 (2013) [hereinafter CDC REPORT], available at
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-report-2013/index.html.
52. Id. at 11-13.
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animals be used judiciously, "only under veterinary oversight and only to
manage and treat infectious diseases, not to promote growth."" Because
U.S. CAFOs use more than 24 million pounds of antibiotics, or roughly 80
percent of the United States' yearly consumption,5 4 for non-therapeutic
purposes each year," they pose a particular threat to human health.
2. Environmental Harms
CAFOs create various environmental harms but particularly pollute the
water and air.56 The principal water pollutant is livestock waste, which can
reach ground water through soil percolation or surface water through
runoff.57 Water bodies in as many as 35 states, in every region of the United
States, have experienced water quality degradation due to such waste.58 This
animal waste contains numerous pollutants, from antibiotics and cleaning
fluids to heavy metals,59 not to mention the nitrogen and phosphorus that
make up all animal excretions.6 0 CAFO animals excrete anywhere from 30
to 90 percent of the antibiotics they consume.6 This pollutant-heavy waste
is thought to be responsible for many of the dead zones in inland and marine
waters, where neither plant nor animal life can survive,62 and the pathogenic
contamination of drinking water.63
Animal waste is also the primary source of CAFO air pollution.6
Because CAFOs by definition do not grow crops on site, the manure must be
transported to other farms or stored." When stored, it is often kept in open-
air "manure lagoons" that release ammonia, nitrous oxide,66 hydrogen
53. Id. at 37.
54. Haag, supra note 10, at 319.
55. See Centner, supra note 43, at I 1-12.
56. GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 52-54.
57. See Hannah Connor, Comprehensive Regulatory Review: Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operations Under the Clean Water Act from 1972 to the Present, 12 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 275, 280-81 (2011).
58. Larry C. Frarey & Staci J. Pratt, Environmental Regulation of Livestock
Production Operations, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 8, 8 (1995).
59. Connor, supra note 57, at 281.
60. GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 52.
61. Centner, supra note 43, at 7.
62. GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 52; Connor, supra note 57, at 281.
63. GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 42.
64. See id. at 52-54.
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id. at 54.
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sulfide, particulate matter,67 and methane." Ammonia has been linked to
increased incidence of headaches, eye irritation, and nausea in people living
near or working at CAFOS 69 and is a respiratory irritant that can lead to
respiratory disease.70 Once volatized and dispersed into the ambient air,
ammonia returns to the earth within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of its origin
and kills plant life.7 Hydrogen sulfide is a neurotoxin7 2 that impairs reaction
time, balance, and the central nervous system, and causes dizziness and
nausea.73  EPA has linked particulate matter to nonfatal heart attacks,
aggravated asthma, and decreased lung function.7 4 Finally, methane and
nitrous oxide are greenhouse gases (GHGs) and are the most potent
contributors to climate change.
C. Government Efforts
There have been many efforts by local, state, and federal governments
to address some aspect of the CAFO problem. Only four will be briefly
discussed here: The Clean Water Act (CWA), EPA's CAA Animal Feeding
Operation Consent Agreement and Final Order ("EPA Consent Decree" or
"Consent Decree"), the proposal of the Preservation of Antibiotics for
Medical Treatment Act (PAMTA), and FDA's industry guidance on the use
of antibiotics in food-producing animals, GFI #209 and #213 from 2012 and
2013 respectively (collectively "FDA Guidance"). They have each been
inadequate to address the CAFO problem for distinct and varied reasons.
67. See Connor, supra note 57, at 281.
68. HRIBAR, supra note 4, at 7 ("The U.S. cattle industry is one of the primary
methane producers."); PEW COMM'N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMALPROD., supra note 1, at
16 (stating that methane is also produced by ruminant livestock's digestive processes).
69. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS: EPA NEEDS MORE INFORMATION AND A CLEARLY DEFINED STRATEGY TO
PROTECT AIR AND WATER QUALITY FROM POLLUTANTS OF CONCERN 1, 6 (2008),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08944.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
70. GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 4.
71. Id. at 52, 54.
72. Kristin Titley, Environmental Law-Regulation of Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations-Reducing the Nuisance: How Arkansas Can Use Its Right-to-Farm Statute
to Protect Against the Destruction ofCAFOs, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 495, 510
(2015).
73. Hoover, supra note 6, at 19-20.
74. Particulate Matter, ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/pm/health.html
(last updated Feb. 23, 2016).
75. See GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 26, 56; HRIBAR, supra note 4, at 7
("[M]ethane and nitrous oxide . . .are 23 and 300 times more potent as greenhouse gases
than carbon dioxide, respectively.").
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1. CWA
The CWA authorizes EPA to directly regulate the discharge of a
pollutant from any point sources by requiring such a source to obtain a
NPDES permit.7 6 The definition of a point source includes CAFOs.7 7 EPA
has attempted to be strict with CAFOs," defining any discharge of "manure
and raw material" from a production area as a "point source discharge, even
if the discharge was caused by or included storm water,"7 9 and requiring
CAFOs to apply for effluent permits, whether or not the operation intended
to discharge effluent.so But EPA's regulatory power in this sphere has been
limited by recent judicial opinions,"' leaving EPA with only the power to
regulate CAFO effluent discharges post hoc.82
2. EPA Consent Decree
In 2005, recognizing that CAFO emissions pose a threat to human
health, but feeling that it lacked sufficient information to promulgate
regulations under the CAA, EPA entered into a consent decree with the AFO
industry.83 Under the Consent Decree, the industry would be required to
fund a monitoring study to determine how CAFOs should be regulated under
the CAA. 84 In return, EPA offered immunity from civil liability for certain
types of past and ongoing CAA, CERCLA, and EPCRA violations, with a
76. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342 (2015).
77. Id. § 1362(14).
78. See James H. Andreasen, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations: A Program
in Transition, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 45, 45-47 (2007).
79. Id. at 46; see 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(3) (2012).
80. Andreasen, supra note 78, at 46; see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(d), (f) (2012).
81. See generally Nat'1 Pork Producers Council v. U.S. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 756 (5th
Cir. 2011) (striking down an EPA regulation requiring CAFOs that propose to discharge
effluent to apply for a permit); Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486,
524 (2d Cir. 2005) (striking down an EPA regulation requiring CAFOs to apply for a
permit whether or not they intend to discharge effluent); see generally also Christopher
R. Brown, When the "Plain Text" Isn't So Plain: How National Pork Producers Council
Restricts the Clean Water Act's Purpose and Impairs Its Enforcement Against Factory
Farms, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 375, 377 (2011); Will McLaren, The Death of Duty to
Apply: Limitations to CAFO Oversight Following Waterkeeper & National Pork
Producers, II J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 87, 112 (2015); Ryan Alan Mohr,
Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA: A Demonstration in Regulating the Regulators, 10 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 17, 18 (2006).
82. McLaren, supra note 81.
83. See Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed.
Reg. 4,958, 4,958 (Jan. 31, 2005).
84. Id.
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promise not to sue." The monitoring study began, but three years later it
was still unclear whether the study could provide the information that EPA
needed to develop emissions protocols.86  EPA has still not issued any
targeted CAFO regulations under the CAA, but in the meantime, the industry
has been permitted to continue their harmful practices without any threat of
regulation.8 7
3. PAMTA
There have also been attempts to address the antibiotic resistance
problem." As early as 1999," Congress has proposed some form of
PAMTA, which would make illegal the over-the-counter non-therapeutic
use, including growth promotion,90 of antibiotics in animals.91  But such
efforts have been unsuccessful.92 The most recent bill, introduced in both
the House and Senate, never received a vote,9' but it is likely that it will be
introduced again in the future.94
4. FDA Guidance
Responding to Congress' inaction and the growing public health
concerns surrounding antibiotic resistance, FDA issued guidance on the use
of antibiotics in animals.95 The guidance advised the industry to be
"judicious" in its use of medically important antibiotics, suggesting that they
be used only therapeutically.96 Yet, as a guidance document, it is not legally
binding. Without any legal effect and its use of ambiguous terms like
85. Id. at 4,962.
86. GAO REPORT, supra note 69, at 34.
87. See generally Mariel Kusano, Rewarding Bad Behavior: EPA 's Regime of
Industry Self-Regulation, 12 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 167, 178 (2006).
88. See Brockway, supra note 12, at 369.
89. Id. at 373.
90. Follmer & Termini, supra note 13, at 66.
91. Haag, supra note 10.
92. Brockway, supra note 12.
93. See id. at 369 (explaining that the House and Senate bills were introduced under
different names but had nearly identical language).
94. Id. at 373.
95. Haag, supra note 10, at 314.
96. See generally FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: THE JUDICIOUS USE OF
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"judicious,"" there are doubts about whether it will have any real impact on
industry's profligate use of antibiotics in CAFO operations."
III. MECHANICS
The CAA offers EPA a number of regulatory tools to address the
numerous air pollution problems created by CAFOs.99 This part will discuss
the regulation of CAFO emissions as criteria pollutants under § 108100 and
its corresponding sections,o'0 as hazardous pollutants under § 112,102 and the
regulation of CAFOs themselves as sources under the New Source
Performance Standards (NSPS) of § 111. Io3 None of these tools will
completely solve the CAFO problem, but as will be discussed further in Part
III, the goal is to employ these regulatory tools to cause the industry to
internalize its negative externalities and improve not only air quality, but the
wellbeing of the environment, humans, and animals generally.
A. § 108 - Setting NAAQS
The heart of the CAA's regulatory scheme is the setting of National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and the corresponding State
97. Id. at 3 (defining judicious as "that unnecessary or inappropriate use should be
avoided").
98. See generally Haag, supra note 10, at 334-35.
99. This is not the first article to recommend and analyze regulation of CAFOs under
the CAA. See Hoover, supra note 6, at 1. Hoover's article deals particularly with these
same regulatory tools, §§ 108-12 of the CAA, and as here concludes that § I11 is the
best tool available under the CAA for regulating CAFOs. That article, written in 2013,
did not have the benefit of the UARG opinion, nor the ongoing Clean Power Plan
litigation, both discussed below. As such, it dealt only cursorily with the regulation of
existing CAFOs under § Ill(d) and was unable to do any of the section-by-section
analysis of whether GHGs are included within the term "pollutant," made necessary by
UARG. In fact, it dedicates only a single sentence of its § Ill analysis to the regulation
of GHGs. In addition to those innovations, this article goes beyond the scope of all other
similar articles in that, to my knowledge, it constitutes the first attempt to consider the
effects of CAA regulation on all CAFO externalities, not just air pollution.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2015). All footnotes will cite to the U.S. Code, but in the body
of the article the public law numbers will be used.
101. §§ 108-10 (42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-10) constitute a suite of sections providing the
NAAQS and SIPS mechanism and go hand-in-hand (Hereinafter, any regulation referred
to as being a § 108 regulation or regulation under § 108 will be understood to refer to
regulations under any part of this suite of sections). Additionally, §§ 165 (42 U.S.C. §
7475) and 171-73 (42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-03) provided authorization for further regulation
of NAAQS pollutants, contingent on compliance or non-compliance in a particular air
quality control region with the NAAQS for a particular pollutant.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2015).
103. Id. § 7411.
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Implementation Plans (SIP) to meet those standards. As a brief description
of the process, § 108 requires, before EPA sets NAAQS for a particular
pollutant, that the pollutant in question be found to "cause or contribute to
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare [and that] the presence of [the pollutant] in the ambient air results
from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources."'" Once EPA has
determined that a pollutant has met these criteria, it has no discretion'0 but
must set primary and secondary NAAQS for that pollutant.10 6 Once the
NAAQS has been set, the states must file an implementation plan explaining
how each of its air quality control regions will meet the NAAQS.'0 7 Air
quality control regions that meet the NAAQS are classified as attainment,
while those that do not meet the NAAQS for a particular pollutant are
classified as nonattainment.08  In nonattainment areas, new and existing
sources that emit the out-of-compliance pollutant are subject to performance
standards' in addition to any regulation required by the corresponding
SIP." 0 In order to prevent attainment areas from falling into nonattainment,
new major sources, sources that have the potential to emit more than 250
tons per year of a pollutant,"' must obtain a Prevention of Serious
Deterioration (PSD) permit, subjecting them to New Source Review (NSR),
and, as with nonattainment areas, must meet performance standards and SIP
requirements."12
Some CAFO emissions are already regulated as criteria pollutants:
there is a NAAQS for particulate matter'.' and EPA may regulate ammonia
104. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(A-B).
105. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 411 F. Supp. 864,868 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
("[A]fter it is determined that a pollutant comes from the necessary sources, there is no
discretion provided by the statute not to list the pollutant").
106. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2015).
107. Id. § 7410.
108. Id. § 7407(d).
109. The specifics of performance standards will not be addressed in this article. It is
sufficient for purposes of the arguments herein to say that the addition of the performance
standards is a significant burden on industry and may be sufficient to alter incentives
and, thus, practices. See Hoover, supra note 6, at 22-28 (arguing that § I11 performance
standards should be used to regulate CAFOs because regulation under §§ 108 and 112 is
insufficient to resolve the CAFO problem).
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-02 (2015).
i11. Id. § 7479(1).
112. See id. § 7475.
113. The most recent set of NAAQS for particulate matter was promulgated in 2013.
See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 78 Fed. Reg. 3,086,
3,086 (Jan. 15, 2013).
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to some degree as a precursor to particulate matter.1"4 The more interesting
question is whether or not hydrogen sulfide, methane, and nitrous oxide can
be effectively regulated under the NAAQS/SIPs program. Hydrogen sulfide,
as a neurotoxin, would likely satisfy the § 108 requirements for a criteria
pollutant as it would likely be found to cause or contribute to pollution that
endangers public health. It is also emitted by numerous sources. "s Yet, even
with a NAAQS, regulation of hydrogen sulfide emissions may be largely
ineffective because such standards regulate the ambient air quality of a
region and not emissions of a pollutant itself. CAFO emissions would
disperse across the region and thus SIPs would require CAFOs to make few
if any changes. In a PSD area, new sources could be directly regulated under
the NSR, but this would likely only discourage the creation of new CAFOs,
not address the current problem. If the region were classified as
nonattainment, both new and existing sources would be required to meet
performance standards."' This could effectively alter CAFO incentives in
that region, but it would function only as a local response to a national
problem.
Methane and nitrous oxide may also satisfy the § 108 requirements to
be regulated as criteria pollutants,"' but GHGs, by their nature, would be
particularly difficult to regulate under NAAQS. The effects of GHGs and
the gases themselves are not localized."' When GHGs are released into the
atmosphere, they disperse equally across the globe."9 Due to this, the
PSD/nonattainment distinction makes little sense for GHG regulation; no
region could ever achieve attainment until every region did so.'20 Moreover,
114. Hoover, supra note 6, at II ("Precursors of criteria pollutants, such .. . ammonia
(a precursor of PM) can also be regulated under this section.").
115. Hydrogen Sulfide Fact Sheet, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEATH ADMIN. (Oct.
2005), https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/dataHurricaneFacts/hydrogen-sulfide-fact.pdf
("Industrial activities that can produce the gas include petroleum/natural gas drilling and
refining, wastewater treatment, coke ovens, tanneries, and kraft paper mills.")
[hereinafter OSHA Fact Sheet].
116. Hoover, supra note 6, at 22-28.
117. See Verheul, supra note 11, at 177-79.
118. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present o Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1153, 1163-64 (2009).
119. Id. at 1163 ("Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are uniform
throughout the atmosphere.").
120. Not to mention that reductions in GHG emissions in the United States alone would
be insufficient to reduce GHG concentrations in the atmosphere enough to stop the ill
effects of climate change. In fact, even if GHG emissions in the United States were
reduced to zero, the negative effects would continue for years to come. See id. at 1174-
76 ("There is a delay of many decades ... [between the emission of GHGs and the]
irreversible, unavoidable consequences that, once realized, can last for literally hundreds
and sometimes thousands of years.").
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setting NAAQS for these GHGs may not be necessary for purposes of
regulating their emission from CAFOs. In Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA ("UARG"),121 the Court held in 2014 that if the source of the GHGs was
already required to meet a PSD performance standard for some other
pollutant, then that same standard could be applied to the GHG emissions.122
Such sources are referred to as "anyway" sources because they will be
subject to regulation whether or not they emit GHGs.123 CAFOs would
qualify as one of these "anyway" sources because they already emit
particulate matter and thus will be regulated "anyway" under the PSD
provisions.124  This ruling makes possible a more GHG appropriate
regulation method: regulation of emissions instead of ambient air quality.
Unfortunately, the "anyway" source reasoning may not extend to sources in
nonattainment areas. The Court rationalized the "anyway" source exception
by citing the exceptionally broad language describing the performance
standard.125 The language defining the applicable performance standards for
sources in nonattainment is, at once, narrower and broader than the language
at issue in UARG. The performance standard for new sources in
nonattainment areas is broader than "each pollutant subject to regulation
under [the CAA]"l 26 because it makes no reference to pollutants at all, going
beyond emissions and tying the standard to the source itself'127 Conversely,
the language for the corresponding standard for existing sources is
significantly narrower, requiring that standards "provide for attainment of
the [NAAQS,]"l 28 which itself regulates only a single pollutant. As these
two standards are constituent parts of a single program and as that program
applies to only one pollutant at a time,129 it is likely that a court would read
the broader language of the new source standard in light of the structure of
the overall program, narrowing it to preclude the application of UARG's
"anyway" source reasoning. Even if the "anyway" source reasoning did
extend to nonattainment areas, as with hydrogen sulfide, it would only
reduce GHG emissions from CAFOs in those few regions and would do little
121. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S.Ct. 2427 (2014).
122. Id. at 2449 (holding that GHG emissions may be regulated via performance
standards if they are emitted from "anyway" sources).
123. Id. at 2438.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 2437.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2015).
127. Id. § 7501(3) (defining the applicable standard of performance in terms of the
source, not the pollutant).
128. Id. § 7502(c)(1).
129. Id. § 7501(2) (defining the scope of nonattainment areas to include "that
pollutant" for which the area has been designated "nonattainment"); see also id. §
7407(d)(i) (tying the designation of nonattainment o a single NAAQS).
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to alter industry incentives or to respond to the growing global climate
change crisis.
The regulation of CAFO emissions as criteria pollutants is further
complicated by cooperative federalism. Because the states are charged with
implementing their plans, they are able to distribute the emission rights
however they please, as long as air quality meets the NAAQS. This is not a
problem if one's sole or prime objective is to reduce air pollution. But as the
focus of this article is to target CAFO externalities generally, § 108 does not
appear to offer the best solution. It leaves open questions regarding the
regulation of GHGs, it may be incapable of addressing the harms of
hydrogen sulfide, and in the end, would likely do little to alter industry
practices.
B. § 112 - Regulation ofHazardous Pollutants
Regulation of hazardous air pollutants under § 112 is a more cut and
dry approach. § 112 empowers EPA to set performance standards for
sources that fall into a listed category and that emit listed pollutants.'
Congress provided an initial list of hazardous pollutants but permits EPA to
revise the list, if a pollutant "present[s], or may present ... a threat of adverse
human health effects [through toxic means] ... or adverse environmental
effects.""' Particulate matter cannot be regulated under this section because
it is regulated under § 108, but ammonia, as a "precursor" pollutant, may.132
In fact, ammonia and hydrogen sulfide appear to comfortably meet these
requirements." Regulating CAFOs under this section is an attractive option
because it has a lower threshold for "major" sources (they need only emit 10
tons of a pollutant per year'34 instead of 250) and because it requires a strict
performance standard.3
This section would not regulate all of the CAFO emissions. Particulate
matter would still have to be regulated as a criteria pollutant, and the GHG
emissions would be left to the uncertainty of "anyway" regulation. Yet,
direct regulation of CAFO emissions would be costly for industry and may
130. Id. § 7412(c).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2) (2015).
132. Id.
133. Compare id., with supra notes 69-73 (demonstrating that ammonia and hydrogen
sulfide do in fact pose both "a threat of adverse human health effects ... [and] adverse
environmental effects").
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2015). But see J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental
Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 305 (2000) (explaining that
agricultural emissions generally do not emit pollutants in sufficient quantities to qualify
for "major source" categorization).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3) (2015).
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begin to alter its incentives. While § 112 provides an incomplete solution, it
may be a viable way to help the industry to internalize CAFO externalities
and thus alter industry practice.
C. § 111 - New Source Performance Standards
§ 111 may offer the most complete answer to the CAFO problem.
Under this section, EPA creates lists of categories and subcategories of
stationary sources.136 When adding a category to the list, EPA must make
an endangerment finding,'3 ' but such a finding is not based on any one
pollutant, but on the category itself.' EPA then promulgates performance
standards for new sources in each category.139 Such performance standards,
unlike NAAQS and performance standards in PSD areas, nonattainment
areas, and under § 112, are not pollutant specific, but category specific.14 0
This permits EPA to regulate the various pollutants emitted from a single
source.14 1 If EPA listed CAFOs as a category of sources, EPA could regulate
CAFO emissions regardless of the regional ambient air quality, no minimum
emissions requirement would have to be met for regulation, and all CAFOs
would be regulated uniformly, being required to meet a truly national
standard.14 2 Moreover, the definition of standard of performance under this
section is exceptionally broad. In setting this standard, EPA may consider
"nonair quality health and environmental impact," 43 precisely the kinds of
concerns CAFOs raise. NSPS is also incredibly flexible, allowing EPA to
"distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within categories of new sources
for the purpose of establishing such standards."1" Thus, EPA can tailor its
standard to the type and size of CAFO to maximize the regulatory effect.
Yet, as discussed above, regulating new sources alone would do little
to respond to the CAFO problem. In addition to setting standards for new
sources, EPA may also promulgate pollutant-specific standards for "any
existing source of any air pollutant" that is not regulated under §§ 108 or
136. Id. § 7411(b).
137. Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
138. Hoover, supra note 6, at 23. Such a finding regarding CAFOs is unlikely to be
difficult due to their many, well-documented harms, as explained in Part I.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2015).
140. See id. ("[T]he Administrator shall publish proposed regulations, establishing
Federal standards of performance for new sources within such category." (emphasis
added)).
141. See id. (indicating that sources are to be regulated, not pollutants).
142. See Hoover, supra note 6, at 22.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2015).
144. Id. § 7411(b)(2).
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112145 "to which a standard of performance under this section would apply
if such existing source were a new source."'46 This gives EPA broad
regulatory authority over existing CAFOs. In fact, it is under this provision
that EPA has promulgated its Clean Power Plan, which lists energy-
generating units (power plants) as a category and sets performance standards
for power plant GHG emissions.147
EPA could likewise list CAFOs as a category and set performance
standards for their emissions. As with § 112, as a criteria pollutant,
particulate matter could not be regulated in existing CAFOs but would in
new CAFOs.14 Ammonia and hydrogen sulfide emissions would be
regulated directly, in both new and existing sources, and would be required
to meet applicable performance standards.149 As for methane and nitrous
oxide, there is some uncertainty whether "any pollutant" under § 111(d) will
be read to include GHGs. The Court in UARG demonstrated a reticence to
accept the broad definition for "pollutant" settled on in MA v. EPA,`so which
145. One of the major issues in the upcoming Clean Power Plan litigation is the
reconciliation of two seemingly conflicting 1990 amendments to the CAA. In 1990, both
the House and the Senate passed amendments to § 111(d) that were never reconciled in
Conference. The crux of the conflict is centered around whether a source category that
is regulated under § 112 may be regulated under § 111(d), even if the two sections call
for the regulation of different pollutants (the House amendment seems to indicate that it
may not, while the Senate amendment seems to indicate that it may). See Carbon
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,710-17 (Oct. 23, 2015) (referring to this
conflicting portion of the statute as the § 112 Exclusion). While the legal question is
fascinating, regulating CAFOs under § ll1(d) would not confront this obstacle because
CAFOs are not a regulated source category in both §§ I11 and 112.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2015). This language indicates both that § I1l(d) is a gap
filling provision (it only applies where §§ 108 and 112 do not) and that § I1l(d) is
inextricably linked to § 111(b). Any existing sources may only be regulated under §
111(d) if new sources of the same source category are also regulated under § 111(b).
This requires EPA to promulgate relatively more regulations than under the other
sections of the CAA, but that is of little consequence because the resulting regulatory
scheme would be considerably more powerful. Id.
147. Ann E. Carlson & Megan M. Herzog, Text in Context: The Fate of Emergent
Climate Regulation After UARG and EME Homer, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 23, 28-30
(2015).
148. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2015) (expressing limitations on regulation to
pollutants not regulated under §§ 108 and 112), with id. § 7411(b) (expressing no such
limitation).
149. See supra note 145. It is important, especially in light of the pollutants that could
be regulated as hazardous air pollutants, that EPA not attempt to mix and match with
regulations under §§ 111 and 112, thereby avoiding the problems associated with the §
112 Exclusion under § 111(d).
150. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 555-57 (2007).
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included GHGs."' Rather, the Court appears interested in reevaluating the
definition of "pollutant" section by section throughout the CAA. Even if
such a reevaluation occurs in § 111(d), a close reading of the language favors
the adoption of the broader MA v. EPA definition. The provision states that
EPA may regulate "any existing source of any air pollutant" so long as it is
not already regulated under §§ 108 or 112 and could be regulated as a new
source under § 111(b).15 2 As mentioned above, there is no pollutant-specific
restriction on § 111(b),153 and thus, like the provision at issue in UARG,' 54 it
is limited only by the scope of the statute.' This would mean that GHGs
could be regulated both in new and existing CAFOs.'" Because § 111 likely
allows EPA to regulate all CAFO emissions directly and offers it the
flexibility to maximize that regulatory effect, it provides the best tool to alter
industry practice and address the CAFO problem.
IV. APPLICATION
As previously mentioned, no regulatory regime under the CAA can
address all aspects of the CAFO problem.' But all of them, unsurprisingly,
address at least some air quality concerns, and, perhaps more surprisingly,
all of them potentially alter industry calculus enough to reduce either other
environmental harms or human health risks.' This part will focus on how
CAFO industry practices may change to avoid or comply with regulation and
how regulation under the CAA inextricably leads to net positive outcomes.
It is important to note, as a threshold matter, that much like CAA
performance standards, this article does not demand any particular action on
the part of the CAFO industry;' it advocates only for EPA to use the
regulatory tools available to it under the CAA to cause the industry to
internalize its considerable negative externalities. Industry may respond to
such internalization in a number of ways, ultimately of its own choosing. As
will be seen below, that response may be as modest as compliance with the
151. Id. at 528-29.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2015).
153. Id. § 7411(b).
154. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2435-36 (2014).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (2015).
156. The inevitable judicial ruling on the Clean Power Plan will resolve this question
one way or the other, but for the purposes of this article, § 111(b), (d) will be presumed
to allow for direct regulation of GHG emissions for any duly listed category.
157. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
158. Supra notes 99-156 and accompanying text.
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2015) (indicating that a standard of performance may
not require the use of specific technology, only that a specific degree of emission
limitation be achieved).
102 [VOL. 12
"ALL I DO IS WIN"
new regulations, which results in higher prices passed on to the consumer,
or as remarkable as disbanding CAFOs altogether. The thrust of this article
is the assertion that no matter where industry's response falls in that
spectrum, regulation of CAFOs under the CAA is a no-lose strategy because
it will result.in net positive outcomes.
A. § 108 Revisited
Attempting to regulate CAFOs using § 108 is not the most effective
option, but it requires the least from the agency in the form of new
regulations and enforcement.'o CAFOs already emit a criteria pollutant and
thus are subject to NAAQS' 6 ' and regulation under the PSD and
nonattainment provisions.'62 Under UARG, the PSD performance standards
extend to CAFO GHG emissions and may extend nonattainment
performance standards to such emissions as well.'63 With a single new
regulation, NAAQS for hydrogen sulfide, EPA could further expand its
authority to regulate all major CAFO air pollutants. If enforced, these
regulations will reduce GHG emissions, albeit regionally, and will reduce
ambient air pollution in some air quality control regions and possibly help
them to achieve attainment status.
Industry may be able to change its practices to avoid regulation, but
such changes would still accomplish other positive outcomes. If the
performance standards under the PSD and nonattainment provisions were
more expensive than reducing emissions, the CAFO industry would be
incentivized to reduce emissions to a kind of middle ground, retaining the
maximum emissions possible while remaining below the threshold for
classification as a major source, and thus avoiding EPA enforcement of the
performance standards." Industry could feasibly do this in either of two
ways: moving some or all of the animal waste offsite or reducing the number
of animals in the feeding operation. Moving the waste would reduce the risk
of ground and surface water pollution from manure lagoon runoff and soil
percolation. It would also add another layer of regulation under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act for transporting hazardous waste.'65
Reducing the number of animals in each operation would have many
positive effects. A CAFO would become less economically viable if fewer
160. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
163. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2436 (2014).
164. Ruhl, supra note 134 (explaining that EPA generally limits its enforcement to
major sources).
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 6923 (2015).
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animals were kept on the premises because fixed costs are a CAFO's greatest
expenditure.16 6 To account for this increase, the CAFO could improve the
conditions of the animals, if only marginally, to increase the sale price of the
animal products. If each animal were given more room, the industry could
advertise the product as "free range."'"' Additional space would obviate
some of the need for such large doses of antibiotics,' which may also reduce
the cost of the operation. A reduction in antibiotics would also be good for
consumers, as it would reduce the risk of antibiotic-resistant pathogens in the
food supply and environment.16 9
Under § 108, these changes seem unlikely. As mentioned above,
industry will make only those changes that make economic sense, and such
changes are likely too expensive to justify not simply biting the bullet of
regulation. Perhaps the one wildcard in this calculus is the application of
performance standards on GHG emissions.170 The technology necessary to
control GHG emissions is extremely expensive,171 so much so that it may
only be required under the most strict performance standards,'72 and thus
may not apply here. If such technology were employed to regulate CAFOs,
it is possible that the industry would opt to make changes rather than comply
with the new regulations. Additionally, the manure lagoons contribute a
relatively small portion of the GHG emissions from CAFOs."' This
improves the possibility 74 that the change the industry would make would
166. See GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 18.
167. However, the industry need not even do that much. The USDA only requires that
"[p]roducers . .. demonstrate to the Agency that the [animal] has been allowed access to
the outside" for the animal products to be labeled as free range. Meat and Poultry




168. See Brad Plumer, The FDA Is Cracking Down on Antibiotics on Farms. Here's




170. See generally Nicole G. Di Camillo, Methane Digesters and Biogas Recovery-
Masking the Environmental Consequences of Industrial Concentrated Livestock
Production, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 365, 370 (2011).
171. See id. at 375-78.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (2015).
173. Camillo, supra note 170, at 378-80.
174. Any increase possibility of reducing the size of the operations under § 108
regulation is marginal. Because the bulk of the CAFO expenses are still fixed costs, this
change would require that CAFOs invert their current business model. See GURIAN-
SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 18. There may be a greater possibility of this under § Ill
regulation.
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be to decrease the size of the operations. It is true that, in a way, such
alterations would constitute a fundamental change to the industry-an
elimination of CAFOs altogether.' This, itself, may not be negative,"' and
it may be the case that alternative industries only need a little help to get the
foothold necessary to topple CAFOs through market forces.177
Even if the only effects of regulation under this section were a
reduction in air pollution and an increase in the cost of animal products,'7 8
this change would still produce a net benefit. As mentioned in Part 1, the
United States is obsessed with unhealthy animal products. The price of meat
and other animal products is already among the lowest in the world, while
we have one of the highest average incomes.179 increasing the price of these
products would create market substitutionso away from fatty meats and
nutrient stricken animal products to healthier alternatives, which would thus
175. This possibility raises concerns about regulatory takings. If CAA regulations are
sufficient to cause the CAFO industry to disappear, it seems a likely candidate for a
constitutional challenge. Yet, such a challenge seems unlikely to succeed in this case
because, as will be explained later in this section and in the section on § Ill regulation
infra, the regulations themselves will not result in the demise of CAFOs, but will simply
cause them to compete on even footing with market alternatives. It would then be market
competition that spells the end to CAFOs. Additionally, given the well-known and well-
documented nature of CAFO harms and actions like the EPA Consent Decree, it is
unlikely that a court would find that the advent of greater regulation interfered with
reasonable investment-backed expectations. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
176. See generally Michelle B. Nowlin, Sustainable Production of Swine: Putting
Lipstick on A Pig?, 37 VT. L. REv. 1079, 1101 (2013) (arguing that any benefits derived
from CAFOs are illusory and that CAFO industry is unsustainable because it produces a
net loss for society); see also GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3 (summarizing the hidden
costs of CAFOs).
177. See generally Leib, supra note 10, at 19.
178. Foscolo & Zimmerman, supra note 11 ("At least in the short term, any tightening
of environmental regulations on conventional farms will almost certainly raise food
prices. . . ."). This is always the baseline assumption of regulation. More regulation
means more cost for industry, which will in turn pass some portion of those costs on to
consumers.
179. See Schneider, supra note 10, at 147 ("[M]eat is cheap in the United States, by
historic standards: Americans today spend about half as much of their disposable income
on meat as they did four decades ago."); PEW COMM'N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD.,
supra note 1, at 3.
180. Such market substitution may not be possible for the lowest income families, as
any increase in cost could make their only economically feasible source of protein too
expensive. This would then lead to such nutrients completely dropping out of their diets.
This seems unlikely given the economic reality just discussed. That being said, such
regressive consequences hould be carefully guarded against.
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improve the health of consumers.'"' § 108 may not be the ideal method of
CAFO regulation, but whether it merely reduces air pollution and the
consumption of unhealthy animal products, or whether it also reduces water
pollution and the risk of antibiotic-resistant pathogens or potentially provides
for the total downfall of CAFOs, it produces net benefits.
B. § 112 -An Advanced Option
As mentioned in Part II, regulation under § 112 would still require that
particulate matter and GHGs be regulated under § 108.182 The analysis in
this section assumes all the incentive altering effects of such § 108
regulation. § 112 would require a little more work on the agency's part, with
two new regulations instead of zero or one."' § 112 brings to the table a
potentially lower threshold for classification as a major source,'84 and thus
an increased likelihood of enforcement, and consistent, nationwide
regulation of the emission, not just the ambient air quality, of both hydrogen
sulfide and ammonia.
Industry could likely avoid the hydrogen sulfide performance standards
by moving the animal waste offsite. Hydrogen sulfide is produced and
emitted through the bacterial decomposition of organic material, here, the
animal waste.' Some hydrogen sulfide emissions would result from the
feeding operations themselves due to the residual waste product inherent in
their unsanitary conditions, but it would be unlikely to meet the threshold of
a major source for hydrogen sulfide emissions. Yet, this is a positive
outcome. It increases the likelihood that all, not just some of the manure
lagoons would be removed, reducing the risk of water pollution and
improving the ambient air quality. If the lagoons are not removed, then they
become subject to double regulation, under the CWA as point sources'86 and
under the CAA as emitters of toxic pollutants.18 7
181. See generally Leib, supra note 10, at 19 (contending that the real solution to the
health crisis is to "make healthier foods more readily available").
182. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
183. Instead of promulgating a NAAQS for hydrogen sulfide, EPA would promulgate
a performance standard for both hydrogen sulfide and ammonia.
184. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2015), with id. § 7479(1) (defining major
sources under § 109 as those that emit or have the potential to emit 100 tons per year of
criteria pollutants while major sources under § 112 are defined as those that only emit 10
tons per year of hazardous pollutants or 25 tons per year of a combination of such
pollutants).
185. OSHA Fact Sheet, supra note 115.
186. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2015).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2015).
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§ 112 provides an advanced regulatory option. By adding performance
standards for two more pollutants, industry is further incentivized to make
changes to CAFOs. It is true that industry may choose to simply swallow
the cost of regulation without making any changes not dictated by the
regulations themselves. But this would still result in reduced pollution and
increased prices. Increased prices would make the alternative (healthier and
more humane) sources of animal products more competitive, providing
consumers with healthier choices and further incentivizing the CAFO
industry to alter its practices or be forced out of the market.'
C. § 111 - Maximum Regulatory Effect
Regulating CAFOs under § I11 requires the most work on the agency's
part, but it would give the CAA maximum regulatory effect and has the best
chance of creating sufficient incentives to alter industry practices. As
mentioned in Part II, under this section, EPA would have authority to
regulate CAFO as a category, and thus apply performance standards to all
their emissions.'89 It could consider factors beyond air quality when setting
the performance standards,'90 and such performance standards could, in an
effort to help the regulated entity to meet proscribed emission limits, require
specific work practices if EPA found it impractical to measure or estimate a
certain class of CAFO emissions."' Industry could only avoid this kind of
regulation by ceasing to be a CAFO,'9 2 and would be forced to either comply
or alter its practices.
188. See GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 68.
189. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2015) (permitting the administrator to "tak[e] into
account. . . any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy
requirements").
191. See Hoover, supra note 6, at 24 ("Many technologies designed to mitigate CAFO
air pollution have not been systematically evaluated, so this may be the best path."
(internal quotation marks removed)).
192. It is, of course, always possible that industry could avoid regulation though
unlawful means or by lobbying Congress to pass a law exempting them from regulation.
Due to the unlikeliness of the first course of action, it will not be considered here.
Potential congressional action, on the other hand, would be a legitimate concern for CAA
regulation of CAFOs. While Congress has not spoken to the issue of CAFO regulation
under the CAA, such a statement would not be the first example of members of Congress
indirectly pressuring EPA to take no action on CAFO pollution. See Scott Edwards, The
Hypocrisy of a Cockroach Congress and CAFO Pollution Control, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-edwards/the-hypocrisy-of-a-
cockroach-congress-b_3521572.html (describing Congress' response to EPA's release
of data about CAFO water pollution and other actions that could undermine the meat
industry). In fact, environmental statutes themselves demonstrate Congress' special
preference for the agricultural industry. See Ruhl, supra note 134, at 293-315 (describing
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Outside market forces amplify the power of the tools in EPA's
regulatory arsenal.'93 As mentioned above, CAFOs are able to produce such
inexpensive animal products because industry is not bearing its production
cost alone.'94 Regulating the emission of every air pollutant from a CAFO
removes the indirect subsidy of non-internalization, almost certainly
increasing the price of CAFO animal products.'" There are already
indications that consumers would choose other, healthier, and more humane
options if the prices were more comparable.96 In fact, the demand for such
animal products is growing.' 97 This is not to say that there is a reasonable
price point at which consumers would stop buying these products altogether;
for meat especially, that does not seem to be the case.' Yet, if the
production costs of CAFO animal products were internalized, other, better
alternatives would thrive.19 9
the "safe harbors" in environmental statutes). It is likely safe to assume, given the current
political makeup of Congress and the sizable nature of the regulation suggested here, that
Congress would take some action. Yet, even this would likely be a net positive.
Congressional action to overturn EPA regulations that benefit public health and welfare,
as CAFO regulations surely would, would both thrust the issue squarely in the public
forum and hold Congress politically accountable for the ongoing harms left unaccounted
for in the market place.
193. See discussion supra "§ 108 Revisited" in Part Ill.
194. PEW COMM'N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., supra note 1, at 47 (explaining
that the failure to internalize CAFO externalities acts as an indirect subsidy to an industry
that is already receiving billions of dollars in direct federal subsidies, resulting in an
inaccurate market price).
195. GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 68.
196. Daniel Payne, Why You Should Eat 'Humane' Meat, THE FEDERALIST (June 24,
2014), http://thefederalist.com/2014/06/24/why-you-should-eat-humane-meat/
(explaining that many people do not purchase "humane" meat because of its relatively
higher price).
197. Stephanie Strom, Demand Grows for Hogs that Are Raised Humanely Outdoors,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/business/demand-
grows-for-hogs-that-are-raised-humanely.html.
198. See, e.g., Sam Gazdziak, Top Meat and Poultry Trends in 2015, PREPARED FOODS
(Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.preparedfoods.com/articles/ 115134-top-meat-and-poultry-
trends-in-2015 (explaining that the rising price of animal products has caused consumers
to "reallocate[] their shopping dollars or switch[] proteins, but they [have] kept meat on
the plate"); Ferdman, supra note 28. But see Natalie Wolchover, Will People Really Be
Forced to Stop Eating Meat?, LIvESCIENCE (Aug. 29, 2012),
http://www.livescience.com/22814-meat-eating-vegetarianism.html (noting that the
amount of meat consumed is decreasing in the United States due to price increases).
199. See GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 68 ("We believe that if CAFOs were
required to take financial responsibility for the harm they cause, and entry into markets
for alternatives was not held back by a heavily concentrated processing industry and
public policies, efficient and safer alternatives would flourish.").
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Additionally, of the possible CAA regulatory schemes, § 111 offers the
best chance of reducing the risk of antibiotic-resistant pathogens. The only
way, short of passing a PAMTA-like law, to get industry to stop using such
massive amounts of antibiotics is to make it economically infeasible and
unnecessary to do so. Under the CAA, there is no tax or penalty provision
for antibiotic use, as it is an environmental, not agricultural statute.
Therefore, CAA can only increase the cost of using antibiotics by increasing
the cost of the operation itself. This is precisely what will occur when the
air pollution externalities are internalized through § 111 regulation. Industry
could avoid such regulation by reducing the duration of animal confinement,
i.e. pasturing the animals, or returning to a more traditional farm-like setting,
sustaining crops or vegetation in their normal growing season,2 00 as their
operations would cease to be CAFOs under the CAA. 2o' Without the
confined, unsanitary conditions, there would be no need for the operation to
purchase such large quantities of antibiotics for non-therapeutic use, and if
the animals were pastured, antibiotics would not be needed to promote the
digestion of grain.202 This would reduce the amount of antibiotics present in
animal products and thus reduce the risk of antibiotic-resistant pathogens in
humans.2 03
While § Il l offers the most effective regulatory answer to the CAFO
problem,20 it is unlikely to resolve this difficulty on its own. The most likely
outcome of any regulation is that the wealthy CAFO industry will simply
accept the regulation2 05 and increase the cost of its products. In response to
consumer complaints, industry will likely blame "bureaucrats" and "over
regulation" for the increase and ask Congress to intervene.206 The burden
will, as always, be on the government to educate the citizenry about the real
cost of CAFO animal products. So long as the regulation remains in place,
this is not a liability. In the end, a major role of environmental legislation
and regulation is to cause industry or other actors to internalize their negative
200. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1) (2012).
201. Assuming that the definition of CAFO under the CAA would be the same as that
under the CWA.
202. See Zboreak, supra note 7, at 158. Pasturing would produce the added benefit of
making the animal products themselves, healthier.
203. See CDC REPORT, supra note 51, at 34-39.
204. That is, the most efficient regulatory answer of those available under the CAA.
205. Surely industry will not take the regulations lying down. It will lobby Congress
and vilify EPA, but it seems more likely that it will submit itself to regulation in the short
term, rather than abandon the CAFO model completely.
206. See supra note 192 for a fuller discussion of the role Congress could play in
preventing CAFO regulation from taking effect and the possibility of such congressional
intervention.
2016]1 109
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
externalities.2 07 § 111 regulation will do just that, reducing air pollution in
the process. Once the market price of CAFO animal products reflects their
real cost, the market will handle the CAFO problem from there.208
V. CONCLUSION
CAFOs are our modem Jungle.209 Their vertically integrated corporate
structure effectively reduces the price of animal products, but at what cost?
They create tremendous environmental harms, serious risks to human health,
and other perplexing negative externalities. There have been numerous
attempts to solve some aspect of the problem and many more suggestions
about how it could be done. Regulation under the CAA, while likely unable
to solve the CAFO problem in its entirety, provides a suite of tools, any one
of which will improve the situation and could put CAFOs on the path to their
eventual demise. By making industry bear the cost of reducing its pollution,
the CAA regulations will improve air and water quality, reduce risks to
human health, respond to the climate change crisis, and, perhaps most
importantly, allow the market for animal products to function efficiently. In
short, CAA regulation creates a win-win scenario.
207. See Foscolo & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 317-18 ("One goal of environmental
law is to reallocate the external costs of pollution onto the polluters themselves.").
208. See GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 68.
209. See UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 404-05 (1906).
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